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The several coverage provisions above were all before the
court recently in a situation involving a worker who, even
prior to the accident in question, was possessed of only bare
"motion vision" at best.2 (He could see motion of an object 14
to 16 inches away from his eye but could not identify the ob-
ject.) The accidental injury for which he now seeks compensa-
tion produced complete blindness in that eye, and it was there-
after necessary to remove it and substitute an artificial orb. The
worker had returned to his job, and his initial claim for total
disability was abandoned. The question before the court was
whether the loss of a virtually useless eye could be regarded as
one that falls within the schedule of specific losses. The opinion
suggested that coverage for the loss of an eye could be afforded
even though the organ was conceded to be utterly useless pre-
viously. This conclusion appears to be consonant with the ac-
cepted approach on specific losses in Louisiana. However, the
award of compensation for one hundred weeks was not rested
on this provision alone. The loss was considered a disfigurement
even though previous to the accident most of the iris or colored
portion of the eye had become white due to the presence of scar
tissue. The substitution of an artificial orb at least presented a
wholly different type of esthetic offensiveness from that which
attended the earlier condition.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
AD VALOREm TAXEs
The field of ad valorem taxes accounted directly for four
cases in the court term and indirectly for another. In the latter
category' Act 155 of 1970, establishing three tax assessors for
Jefferson Parish, was held violative of Louisiana Constitution
article XIV, § 9, which provides for a tax assessor to be elected by
each parish. The court in a rather interesting and to some extent
droll discussion of the meaning of "a" as "one," or "at least one"
or "any" concluded that on the basis of the totality of the
Constitution, "a" in this instance meant "one" and affirmed the
23. Landry v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 258 La. 649, 247 So.2d 564 (1971).
$ Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. Chehardy v. Democratic Executive Comm., 259 La. 45, 249 So.2d 196
(1971).
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trial court's judgment that Act 155 was unconstitutional. In
Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Louisiana Tax Commission,2 a court
of appeal applied the provisions of R.S. 47:1998, granting to tax-
payers who have filed a sworn list of property the right of
judicial appeal, to uphold a decision of the trial court refusing
an appeal to a taxpayer who had not filed such a list. This
decision is in accord with the relatively recent supreme court
decision in Dixon v. Flournoy,8 but as a rather vigorous dissent
by Judge Redmann points out, certain constitutional questions
of due process are not answered. Apparently encouraged by the
dissent, the taxpayer filed an application for rehearing, only
to be met with the court's citation of a long line of cases holding
that contentions not urged on appeal, in either oral argument
or in brief, are waived. 4
In a case decided by another court of appeals,5 the Dixon
case was also involved, but the court concluded that the tax-
payer was contesting the tax itself rather than the assessment
and that therefore neither R.S. 47:1998 nor Dixon was appli-
cable. Citing State ex rel. United Seamen's Service, Inc. v. City
of New Orleans,6 which recognized the distinction between the
right to sue to annul an assessment and the right to sue to
reduce an assessment, it reversed the judgment of the trial court
sustaining an exception of no right of action and remanded the
matter for a trial on the merits.
The same court of appeal had before it a case 7 involving
the taxibility of accounts receivable owned by Chrysler Credit
Corporation which were secured by chattel mortgages on motor
vehicles and which were due from selected Chrysler dealers
who financed their automobile inventories in this fashion. The
chattel mortgage forms were often improperly authenticated
and seldom recorded. The trial court found the mortgages to
secure the loans in form only and to be violative of certain
provisions of the law. The court of appeal reversed, finding the
mortgages valid as between the parties and therefore loans
"secured by mortgages on property located exclusively in the
2. 249 So.2d 594 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
3. 247 La. 1067, 176 So.2d 138 (1965).
4. 249 So.2d 594, 602 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
5. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 251 So.2d 392 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971).
6. 209 La. 797, 25 So.2d 596 (1946).
7. Chrysler Financial Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 251 So.2d 482
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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State of Louisiana" and as such, exempt from taxation under
article IV, § 4, par. 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. The
request of the Tax Commission that the proceedings be dis-
missed for failure to comply with R.S. 47:1998 was denied on
the basis of Ford Motor Credit" and the cases cited therein.
In Laventhal v. Lake Investment Corp.,9 the court found that
the plaintiff had failed to prove the corporeal possession neces-
sary to prevent the running of the five year peremption with
reference to quieting of tax title provided by article X, § 11
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 as supplemented by R.S.
47:2228.
SALES AND USE TAxEs
Indicative of the fact that local taxing authorities are becom-
ing more aggressive in the sales and use tax field were three
cases involving these taxes. The supreme court had before it for
review, in St. John the Baptist Parish School Board v. Marbury-
Patillo Construction Co.,10 a taxpayer's right to contest the tax-
ing authority's determination of the tax due; the waiver of
penalties; and, the ultimate liability of the owner for such taxes.
The court of appeal 1 had held that it was error on the part
of the trial court to accept the estimated base for the tax since
it consisted of the entire amount of the contract plus an addi-
tional arbitrary sum added to cover on-site equipment. Noting
that the tax was levied only on tangible personal property pur-
chased, used or consumed in the parish, it re-examined the
evidence, disallowed the on-site equipment, deducted 20% as
allowance for profit and overhead, and estimated that 60% of
the remainder was subject to tax as materials purchased. It had
also disallowed interest -and penalties on the theory that the
taxpayer was in good faith in resisting the tax. It had rejected
an attempt to impose the tax liability on the port commission
for which the terminal had been constructed on the ground
that the commission was only a purchaser, not a purchaser-
dealer, and hence exempt within the statute. The dissent would
have rejected the suit on the ground that in proceeding by
8. 251 So.2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
9. 252 So.2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
10. 259 La. 1133, 254 So.2d 607 (1971).
11. 239 So.2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), discused in The Work of the
Louisiana Appelate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-State and Local Taxa-
tion, 32 LA. L. Rzv. 311, 313 (1972).
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estimate, the taxing authority was attempting an illegal jeopardy
assessment; the majority had been willing to characterize the
suit as properly brought, however, subject only to the objec-
tion that the assessment was based on an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable calculation.
The supreme court granted writs and held that the school
board's estimate of the taxes due had to be accepted because
of (1) the definition of cost price, and (2) the failure of the
taxpayer to file all its defenses prior to the time fixed for hearing.
There is considerable jurisprudence supporting the latter con-
clusion; there is a serious question concerning the application
of the definition to the facts of this case. The court further held
that defenses to the applicability of the statutory penalties were
also waived by not being timely filed but indicated that good
faith and substantial efforts to comply would not be grounds for
waiver-a holding which would seem to overrule the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion on this same point in the Richardson case.12
It agreed that the Port Commission owner was not liable for
the tax on the ground that it did not contract for the pur-
chase of movable property but rather for the construction of
immovables. This holding is in accord with several other cases
on this same point although none of these cases were cited
by the court.'8
The other two cases involved the sales tax levied by the
Lafayette Parish School Board. To all Intents and purposes that
tax is identical with the state sales tax levied by the provisions
of R.S. 47:301. In Lafayette Parish School Board v. General
Tire & Rubber Co.,'14 the court had no difficulty in finding that
General Tire was a dealer within the ordinance and as such
subject thereto, despite the fact that the company maintained
no retail outlet in the parish, nor did it have salesmen or em-
ployees therein. It did have an authorized dealer in the parish
who purchased and resold tires to its customers and who serviced
General Tire national account customers in Lafayette Parish.
The court found that the local distributor was an agent of
General Tire with reference to the national accounts and that
this relationship provided a sufficient minimum connection to
12. Collector of Revenue v. J. L. Richardson Co., 247 So.2d 151 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
13. Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 1061, 99 So.2d
345 (1957); State v. J. Watts Kearney & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934).
14. 249 So.2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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satisfy due process requirements. In L. A. Frey & Sons v.
Lafayette Parish School Board,15 the court considered the ap-
plicability of the tax to purchases by L. A. Frey of non-return-
able cardboard containers and of sawdust used to smoke its
meat products. The court ruled that the cardboard containers
were purchased for resale and the sawdust was purchased for
further processing into articles of tangible personal property
for sale at retail, and therefore not subject to tax. Both rulings
appear to be at variance with the long standing position of the
State Department of Revenue 0 and therefore possibly contrary
to the holding of the Louisiana supreme court that the adoption
of a statute from another jurisdiction includes all of the authori-
tative interpretations and constructions theretofore placed on
such statute.17
O'rH TAXES
The Louisiana Corporation Franchise Tax statute 8 includes
borrowed capital in the tax base and defines borrowed capital as
"all indebtedness of a corporation subject to the provisions of
this Chapter, maturing more than one year from the date in-
curred."'1 In HEP Development Corp. v. Mouton, a court of
appeal determined that property purchased by a taxpayer sub-
ject to a mortgage, but which mortgage was not assumed by the
purchaser, nevertheless constituted borrowed capital within the
meaning of the statute. The court recognized the jurisprudence
to the effect that one who purchases property subject to a
mortgage but without assuming same incurs no personal liability,
but chose to interpret the statute broadly "to accord it full
legislative intent." The court refused to follow non-Louisiana
authorities to the contrary, citing a Louisiana case5 ' which it
believed supportive of a contrary result.
The value of a revocable inter vivos trust whose assets
consisted of stocks, bonds, debentures, treasury bills, cash and a
mineral interest, all physically located in Oklahoma, was held
15. 262 So.2d 132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
16. See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Promulgated in Connection with
Louisiana General Bales Tax (Supp. 1964)-Article 2-19--Containers; Articles
2-71(4)-Printers's suppliers; Article 2-72-Paper and Ink.
17. Standard Oil Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So.2d 268
(1946).
18. LA. R.S. 47:601 (1950).
19. LA. R.S. 47:603 (1950).
20. 256 So.2d 744 (La. App. lot Cir. 1971).
21. State v. Union Building Corp., 185 La 598, 170 So. 7 (1936).
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includible in the succession of the Louisiana domiciled grantor
for the purpose of ascertaining the inheritance tax due in
Succession of Reynolds.2 2 The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully
that a revocable inter vivos trust is not a gift in contemplation
of death but rather a gift intended to take effect at or after
death. Because Louisiana taxes inheritances, legacies, donations
and gifts made in contemplation of death23 as opposed to the
federal taxation of the estate of the decedent, a factual situa-
tion may arise where this argument would be accepted by a
court. The state's right to tax movable property owned by Lou-
isiana residents wherever situated 24 was apparently resisted
by the taxpayer on jurisdictional grounds which the court
brushed aside on the basis of the executor having filed the suit
in question and on the authority of Curry v. McCanless.25 While
Curry is still good authority for the right of the state of domicile
to tax intangibles belonging to its residents, it adverted to the
general rule that tangibles may be taxed only by the govern-
ment within whose territorial limits they are found.26 Quaere:
Are cash and mineral interests tangibles within the meaning
of the general rule?
The sweet potato tax27 continued to be a source of litigation
in State v. United Vegetable Growers Association, Inc.,28 where
the taxpayer filed its defenses to a rule for the taxes some nine-
teen days after the date first set for hearing and could not over-
come the statute29 and jurisprudence8 0 which bar the considera-
tion of defenses not timely filed.
In Smith v. Louisiana Sweet Potato Advertisement & De-
velopment Commission,31 the plaintiff-shipper of sweet potatoes
claimed that since persons belonging to cooperative associations
and farmers who shipped their own potatoes were exempt from
the tax, its application only to persons in the sweet potato
business who neither shipped their own sweet potatoes nor be-
22. 260 So.2d 811 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
23. LA. R.S. 47:2401 (1950).
24. LA. R.S. 47:2404(A) (1950).
25. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
26. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
27. LA. R.S. 3:451 (1950).
28. 260 So.2d 26 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
29. LA. R.S. 13:5032 (1950).
30. St. John the Baptist Parish School Bd. v. Marbury-Patillo Constr.
Co., 259 La. 1133, 254 So.2d 607 (1971); State v. Ernest M. Loeb Co., 8 So.2d
739 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
31. 264 La. 64, 262 So.2d 371 (1972).
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longed to marketing cooperative associations violated the equal
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Al-
though the plaintiff's indignation at having to bear the entire
tax burden for advertising which benefits all sweet potato
farmers is understandable, the court's conclusion that there
was a reasonable basis for the classification between shippers
and growers and that the legislation was therefore constitutional
should not have surprised anyone in view of previous decisions
in the area of classification.82
PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
MOTION TO SUPPRss
In State v. Wilkerson,' the supreme court held that the mo-
tion to suppress can be used to provide a pretrial determination
of the admissibility of identification testimony resulting from
a lineup. The court recognized that
"although a literal reading of Article 703 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure would seem to confine that motion to search
and seizure evidence and evidence of written confessions
and inculpatory statements, the motion is well attuned to
the relief sought in this case, we have sanctioned it, and
Article 3 of the Code provides authorization for the position
we have taken."
Article 3 authorizes courts to adopt procedures, although not
specifically created by legislation, which are "consistent with
the spirit of this Code."
In sustaining the use of the motion in cases involving iden-
tification evidence, it is submitted that the court did not require
that objections to identification procedures necessarily be raised
by pretrial motion to suppress. It merely sanctioned the use of
the motion in such instances. In State v. Walker,4 the defense
32. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); State Dept. of Agric. v.
Sibille, 207 La. 877, 22 So.2d 202 (1945); State v. Arthur Duvic's Sons, 185
La. 647, 170 So. 23 (1936).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State Uniersity.
1. 261 La. 342, 259 So.2d 871 (1972).
2. Id. at 350, 259 So.2d at 873.
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3.
4. 261 La. 545, 260 So.2d 618 (1972).
